Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: THere's a trap in the proposal: the proposed
entities are to be "independent"

"Independent" = sovereign.

It is not just that I have a lot more respect for the ingenuity of the
Palestinians to exploit sovereignty.

I recognize that the world is full of nations that are hardly friends of
Israel that will also seek to exploit this sovereignty against us.

Ingenuity? Truth is that you don't have to be the sharpest tool in the
diplomatic shed to come up with a devastating program.

"Autonomous"? Sure.

"Independent"?

No way!
==================

THE EIGHT STATE SOLUTION by Mordechai Kedar
http://www.cijr.com/eight-state-solution-mordechai-kedar

Palestinian territorial contiguity is dangerous for Israeli national
security. For security and demographic reason, Israel must retain as much
land as possible in the West Bank. Evacuation of these areas will create a
dangerous situation for Israeli security and eventually will necessitate
reconquering extensive parts of the West Bank. There is no reason to
dismantle and destroy the existing settlements, rather we propose the
creation of seven independent and separate city-states within the West Bank,
in addition to Gaza.

Premise:

There is no reason to assume that a Palestinian state will not become
another failing Arab state, due to the fragmented society in the West Bank
and Gaza, tribalism and the lack of awareness of nationhood as demonstrated
by the failing performance of the Palestinian Authority since its
establishment in 1994.

Since nobody in the world can assure that a Palestinian state will never
turn – like Gaza – into an Islamic terror state, any solution for the
Palestinians must minimize its potential threats on Israel, on the region
and on the world.

Social stability is the key for political stability. Many existing Arab
states are models only of ineffectual governance; the only successful model
for an Arab state is the one which is based on a single consolidated
traditional group such as each of the individual Arab Gulf Emirates. The
standard Arab states - Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, which are conglomerates of
tribes, religions, sects and ethnic groups – present the opposite picture.
It is our belief that the successful Emirate model can be implemented in the
Palestinian case more easily and successfully than the failing Arab model.

Problems with Territorial Contiguity:

Over the years, many Israelis and others have adopted the Arab-Palestinian
narrative that views territorial contiguity as a condition for the
establishment of a viable Palestinian state. As a result of this narrative
and its pervasiveness worldwide, efforts are made to insure that the West
Bank Palestinians will have an integral territory from Mount Gilboa in the
north to the outskirts of Beersheba in the south. Thus, the large Israeli
settlement blocs in the West Bank become thin “fingers,” with no ability to
expand, and their inhabitants, easy targets.

Meanwhile, the central strategic goal of the state of Israel should be to
permanently remain in Judea and Samaria and to prevent Palestinian
territorial contiguity. There are dangers of maintaining territorial
contiguity in the West Bank. While it will facilitate the Palestinians’
movement and allow them a better life, the repercussions are impractical for
Israel. Territorial contiguity will compromise Israel’s security for the
following reasons:

Rockets. Territorial contiguity will enable weapons smuggled from Gaza to
easily reach all parts of the West Bank and to be used against the
surrounding major Israeli landmarks and cities. For example, Israel’s only
international airport, nuclear reactor, and towns such as Petah Tikva, Kfar
Saba, and Afula in addition to Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel Aviv will fall
within rocket range.

Non-viability of Palestinian governments. Experience has shown that
Palestinian governments do not resolutely and consistently act against
terrorists. Political and media messages since 1994 have proven that neither
the PLO nor Hamas have prevented terrorism and the proliferation of weapons.
There also is no evidence that any Palestinian government will prevent
terrorism, even if Israel withdraws all the way to the Green Line. A further
danger is the possibility of a Hamas takeover in Judea and Samaria and the
creation of a terror state like the one in the Gaza Strip.

Tunnels. After the completion of the security fence in the West Bank, the
Palestinians are likely to dig tunnels along the perimeter, as they have
done along the Gaza-Egyptian border. These tunnels can be used to smuggle
explosives and terrorists in and out of Israel. Palestinian territorial
contiguity will make it easier for terrorists to bring explosives into
Israel via the tunnels.

Territory. Transferring land to the Palestinians will remove the IDF
presence from Palestinian towns. Two problems arise with this scenario.
First, every strategic location Israel evacuates is at risk of becoming an
arms depot and a haven for launching missiles into Israel. Second, any IDF
operation against terror in these towns will require movement through
hostile territory. This eliminates the element of surprise, essential for an
operation’s success and forces the IDF to cope with explosives, mines and
ambushes on the way to the target. By remaining in the rural areas of the
West Bank, the IDF will more easily have the capacity to collect
intelligence and to perform military operations against terrorists, if
needed.

Water. Most of Israel’s water comes from an aquifer located under the Judea
and Samaria. Palestinian sovereignty over the aquifer will create a grave
water problem, compounded by the presence of tens of thousands of Israelis
who will need to be evacuated from the settlements of Judea and Samaria.

Arab neighbors to the East. Palestinian territorial contiguity will cut off
the strategically vital Jordan Valley from Israel, exposing it to dangers
from the east - Jordan, Iraq and Iran. The threat posed by Iraq and Iran is
thus greatly magnified by the loss of this territory.

Settlements. Retaining the rural areas in Judea and Samaria will
significantly reduce the number of settlements to be dismantled, increase
the chances that evacuation of settlements will be accomplished by
agreement, decrease the expenditures for compensation and rebuilding, and
limit the destructive repercussions on Israeli society. At present, there
are serious social disruptions resulting from the events of Gush Katif,
northern Samaria, and Amona. There is also a growing distrust and the
resultant alienation from the political establishment and the democratic
system by religious Zionists and settlers. Efforts should be made so that
further withdrawals will be conducted in cooperation with the settlers and
not in opposition to them.

Solution: Palestinian City-States

For all the reasons mentioned above, Israel must strive to block the
territorial contiguity of the West Bank while maintaining the Israeli
presence in the area between Ramallah and Nablus, including the settlements
of Ofra, Shilo, Eli, Yizhar, Itamar, and the region of Ma’ale Efraim.

Therefore, the proposed plan is the creation of eight independent and
separate city-states within the West Bank, having a limited rural periphery,
that will enable future expansion and the establishment of industrial zones.
The towns that will receive independence are under this plan are Hebron (the
Arab part), Jericho, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Tul-karem and Qalqilya.
Bethlehem will require further consideration. At the same time, Israel must
create a situation of de facto annexation of the majority of the rural
areas, while granting Israeli citizenship to those Arab residents of the
villages who want it.

Such a de facto division, sustained over time, will foster the development
of local rule and facilitate the establishment of political entities based
on each separate city-state.

In its public relations outreach, Israel will put forth and explicate the
concept that size alone does not determine the success or failure of a
state. For example, Monaco, Lichtenstein, San Marino and Luxembourg are
small states with a high quality of life, while Algeria, Libya, and Sudan
are large states with poor quality of life. Thus, it is demonstrable that
size is less important than effective government. So far, the Palestinians
have shown their inability to manage an orderly, peaceful political system
that has renounced terror. Until this happens, Israel must retain as much
territory as possible to defend its citizens.

Hurdles

There are three major hurdles for Israel regarding the question of
territorial contiguity. The first deals with the differences in social
characteristics between Gaza and the West Bank. In Gaza, there is a high
percentage of refugees and Bedouins, while by contrast, their concentrations
in the West Bank are smaller. The levels of education and income are also
unequal, and even the spoken language differs. As a result, it appears that
the political separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will
continue. Considering that the prevailing historical competition and
tensions between Nablus and Hebron have created friction within the
Palestinian Authority, it can be reasonably assumed that their separation
into two states will be tacitly accepted.

A second hurdle that Israel must overcome is the Supreme Court. Currently,
the Supreme Court has taken on the role of demarcating the country’s
borders. To undo this role, the Knesset must pass a basic law, by which the
government declares that the setting of borders is a political rather than a
judicial act. Indeed, defining a state’s borders has political (not legal)
significance, and it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to continue
managing Israel’s relations with its enemies.

The third and highest hurdle is Israeli public opinion, which has adopted
the terms “Palestinian territories” and “occupied territories.” This
terminology is taken from the Arab-Palestinian narrative that Europe has so
enthusiastically adopted and espoused. These terms are problematic because
there still is no Palestinian state and, therefore, no “Palestinian
territory.” The region of Judea and Samaria is a territory without
sovereignty, and the ability to claim sovereignty over it exists for any
state that borders it, including Israel. The existence of Israeli
settlements over dozens of years is sufficient for claiming sovereignty.
Moreover, the residents of the territory are Israeli citizens. The
settlements do not infringe on the sovereignty of any existing state. Since
these territories are vital to Israel’s security, the government needs to
construct and propagate a new and different narrative. They should use these
arguments to inform and so, combat, negative public opinion.

From the standpoint of demography, the rural areas in the West Bank
constitute a small burden relative to the size of the territory that will be
added to the state through annexation. Hence, there is almost no need to
relinquish these areas out of demographic considerations. Israel will
provide these residents a choice between citizenship and residency, the same
choice possessed by the Arab residents of East Jerusalem.

Taking into consideration Israel’s security requirements, it is imperative
to block the territorial contiguity of any future Palestinian entity. Israel
should encourage and assist the establishment of eight “city-states” in the
towns of Judea and Samaria, which will be independent and separate.
Technical problems arising from the separation between them can be solved if
their residents maintain good neighborly relations with Israel.

Israel must retain as much rural land in the West Bank as possible,
particularly the area between Ramallah and Nablus, for security and
demographic reasons. Evacuation of these areas will create a dangerous
situation for Israeli security and will necessitate reconquering extensive
parts of the West Bank. According to this scenario, there is no reason to
dismantle and destroy most of the existing settlements.

It would be a dangerous folly to relinquish these areas of the West Bank and
would result in undermining Israel’s security and economy. Such ideas stem
from the adoption of Arab-Palestinian, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli
rhetoric would must be strongly refuted. It is imperative that Israel do
everything possible to thwart such an outcome.
=============================
Mordechai Kedar, PhD, the director of the Center for the Study of the Middle
East and Islam (under formation); a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies; a lecturer at the Department of Arabic, Bar-Ilan
University, Ramat Gan, Israel. Mordechai.kedar@biu.ac.il