[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: It would have been nice to reflect on the
significance that the greatest achievement of the War - Operation Specific
Gravity - was thanks to the insistence of civilian DM Amir Peretz who
overruled all the brass who thought he was an idiot for ordering that the
IAF destroy the Fajr Rockets before they could be repositioned by
Hezbollah. The brass wanted to start by pounding Lebanese infrastructure.

As for learning lessons. Were all the lessons learned?

Let's not forget the painful shocker from the Gaza war years later: Israeli
intelligence knew about the Hamas tunnels into Israel but were clueless as
to what Hamas could do with the tunnels.

One can lose sleep wondering if the folks responsible for intelligence have
taken the necessary steps not to be clueless next time.

Frankly speaking, the reason it is a source of concern is that the otherwise
intelligent senior people who have said that remark about having been
clueless about what Hamas could do with the tunnels never seemed to indicate
that this was an admission of a profound failure.

And if they didn't appreciate that it was a profound failure does this mean
that military intelligence continues to be a contradiction in terms?]
=========================

The Lessons of Israeli Military Intelligence
The upheaval caused by the Second Lebanon War definitely led to the on-going
"intelligence revolution" the IDF Intelligence Directorate has been
undergoing since 2006
Gideon Mitshnik | 17/07/2016
http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/lessons-israeli-military-intelligence

Two different incidents that took place during the first day of the Second
Lebanon War reflected, to a considerable extent, the story of the military
intelligence in that war. In the first incident, IDF intelligence had failed
to provide a concrete alert regarding Hezbollah's intended abduction attack
on the morning of July 12 and IDF failed to prevent that attack. Conversely,
the second incident involved the "Night of the Fajr Rockets" and the success
of Operation Specific Gravity in which IAF destroyed dozens of Fajr
medium-range rocket launchers. These rockets had been concealed in houses
and were a part of one of Hezbollah's top secret projects. The successful
elimination of those rocket launchers was made possible by exceptional
intelligence achievements and deep penetration. This accomplishment led to
distress among the ranks of Hezbollah, as thorough backtracking and
self-examination were required in order to attempt and understand how
Israeli intelligence had managed to penetrate to such depths.

In an informal conversation with one of the members of the Winograd
Commission during the preparation of this article, he stated: "The problem
with the War did not concern the intelligence aspect." This is a substantial
statement, as the intelligence balance during the Second Lebanon War was
indeed mixed and complex and could not be defined in terms of success or
failure, but rather as a collection of numerous failures in various
activities alongside significant success stories. To make things even more
complex, gaps and even tensions and differences between some intelligence
elements and senior officers of the IDF General Staff were clearly evident.

The Winograd Commission of Inquiry for the Second Lebanon War addressed, in
its overt report (and with even more detail in its classified report)
numerous deficiencies of the military intelligence, regarding the over-all
preparations in the period prior to the War as well as regarding the actual
intelligence work during the War, mainly with regard to the performance
aspect. In the preface to the chapter on intelligence in the overt report,
the Commission stated: "All in all, the intelligence effort was successful
with regard to several highly important fields. Some of the intelligence
accomplishments were particularly impressive. However, on the day of
reckoning – as predictable as it was – gaps became visible with regard to
the intelligence information and capabilities, along with deficiencies in
the conduct of the intelligence elements opposite the elements they were
intended to serve, within the supreme political and military echelons and
among the combat elements."

And to quell any remaining doubts, the Commission positioned the part played
by the intelligence in that War in context and to scale: "As important as
they are, the deficiencies associated with military intelligence matters –
with the exception of the target intelligence category – did not directly
influence the results of the War."

The Primary Failure – Field Intelligence

The prevailing concept since the War is that the primary
intelligence-related failures occurred in the context of tactical
intelligence and the preparations of the intelligence elements of IDF
Northern Command and, naturally, the failure of the IDF Navy and Navy
Intelligence in the absence of an alert regarding the possibility of attacks
against Navy vessels using the C-802 shore-to-ship missile. But the report
by the Winograd Commission that focused on military intelligence (and hardly
addressed the Mossad and other intelligence agencies) made no concessions
and an in-depth review of that report yields criticism as well as problems
and failures along the entire length of the intelligence front, including
the strategic level.

The report refers to two distinct periods: the intelligence preparations
between the year 2000 and the outbreak of the War, and the performance of
the military intelligence during the war. With regard to the aspect of
"Operational Intelligence" (strategic intelligence) as per the Commission's
definition, "The accomplishments of the intelligence analysis activity at
the General Staff and Northern Command in the period prior to the war were
substantial." In this context, they noted, with a kind of commendation:
"There was full and correct understanding of the implications… regarding the
essence of the threat Hezbollah had presented opposite Israel, including the
issue of its diversified capabilities in the field of launching
surface-to-surface rockets…" On the other hand, referring to the interface
between the intelligence and the political-defense echelon and the
decision-making process during the War, the Commission had some criticism
that referred mainly to the gap between the potential and the actual ability
of the intelligence to influence the decision makers and the actual
occurrences: "Apparently, one area where the intelligence community had a
more substantial ability to influence the War was in the context of the
decision-making process on July 12 and the first few days thereafter,
including the first few days of the War. This time, more than at any other
time, when the professional echelons of the IDF Intelligence Directorate had
the key to cracking the enemy's riddle, they failed to exploit it opposite
the military and political leaders. While the intelligence concept was
generally correct, failures occurred in the process of submitting it to the
leaders. In essence, it was a time-consuming process that had numerous
partners and implications. As stated, some of those 'missed opportunities'
were not to be found exclusively in the courtyard of the intelligence, but
some of them were definitely in that courtyard."

The Commission further ruled and found the IDF Intelligence Directorate
responsible for another failure: despite the fact that a new Prime Minister
and a new Defense Minister had taken office, no specific discussion focusing
on the Lebanese sector and enabling a presentation of the entire range of
threats and implications was ever conducted. The Winograd Commission ruled
that "A sharp transition was made to a lower state of familiarity, which was
not thoroughly complemented until the breakout of the War," and that "The
intelligence insights regarding Hezbollah and their implications as far as
Israel was concerned were not discussed in a thorough and serious manner
between the Prime Minister and Defense Minister and the intelligence
chiefs."

The primary failure involved the various activities of the field
intelligence. Regarding the tactical intelligence, the Commission's report
states: "At the tactical level – the picture regarding the ground forces was
characterized by lapses and gaps. The assimilation of the intelligence by
the operational units was deficient… Some of the information was partial in
its contents, or not sufficiently detailed." The report stated further: "At
the operative and tactical levels as well as at the cultural-ethical level,
the intelligence picture was not so good, revealing substantial and even
crucial gaps."

The Difference between Knowledge and Awareness

The opening incident of the Second Lebanon War at Report Line 105 – the
ambush and abduction of two IDF soldiers – constitutes an example of the
failure of the tactical level intelligence. Without getting into the
internal investigations conducted after the War or the question of whether
or not advance information had been available but was not reported in time,
the intelligence failed, in this case, to identify the complex preparations
for the operation by Hezbollah, which consisted of numerous stages, involved
numerous forces and took place within arm's reach of our own forces. That
failure had also been indicated in the operational analyses regarding the
combat operations of the IDF 36th Division even before the Winograd
Commission was appointed.

The criticism leveled against the field intelligence and regarding
substantial deficiencies in the way it conducted its activities and in the
way other elements conducted themselves opposite it (for example, the
failure to deliver materials prior to and during the War, the fact that
intelligence aids had been left at the emergency storage depots) was not
only reflected in the Winograd Commission's report but was also raised by
the field echelon. It was alleged that in many instances relevant
intelligence was not reported to the company and platoon level.
Additionally, numerous allegations were made that in the Second Lebanon War,
the warfighters on the ground experienced the same problem the IDF
warfighters had experienced during the Yom-Kippur War: the intelligence
elements up to a certain level were thoroughly familiar with Hezbollah's
anti-tank, surveillance and artillery capabilities, but the forces on the
ground were taken by surprise, which once again highlights the difference
between knowledge and awareness.

In this context, Major (res.) Amir Dahan, a judge in civilian life as well
as in IDF and a deputy commander of a reconnaissance company in his
secondary capacity, stated in an article he published in the periodical
"Ma'arachot" after the War, that one phenomenon encountered again during the
War involved the fact that excellent intelligence had been available at the
brigade and battalion level, but that intelligence almost never reached the
company and platoon level and the individual troopers, and the intelligence
that they did receive was faulty. Other commanders supported that allegation
and confirmed "We did not have intelligence," while also claiming that they
only learned about Hezbollah's "nature reserves" when they actually ran into
them. Major Dahan suggested that a layout of "intelligence squads" be
established within the reserve companies, to provide a solution for the
intelligence gaps.

Brigadier-General (res.) Yuval Halamish, who served as the IDF Chief
Intelligence Officer during the Second Lebanon War, has addressed this issue
in detail last week, stressing that "The intelligence had a very good
understanding of Hezbollah's deployment, their strategic missile layouts and
operational doctrine," but conversely, "The intelligence picture regarding
the deployment of the short-range Katyusha rocket layout was mediocre to
weak," and admitted that one of the primary problems of the intelligence
prior to and during the War was the performance and capabilities of the
field intelligence elements.

A New Generation that Knew Nothing about Lebanon

The most prominent manifestation of the failure in the tactical intelligence
field was the dramatic way in which Hezbollah's "nature reserves" surprised
the IDF warfighters. The statements made by Halamish clearly reflect the
severity of the gap between the knowledge of the facts and the assimilation
thereof at the field level, as the Winograd Commission also noted: "The
intelligence was fully aware and familiar with the 'nature reserve' issue.
We may have not been familiar with all of the locations, we did not always
have in-depth details of what was actually happening in each village, but
the general picture was well known. Moreover, IDF had even built a model of
a 'nature reserve', for training the various units. Much to my regret, owing
to (budget) cuts and the activity in the territories, only a handful (of
units) actually trained there. Additionally, the quality of Hezbollah's
camouflage was very high, so it was very difficult to practically impossible
to spot those complexes from the air within the dense woods. As a result,
units that reached the gateway to a 'nature reserve' on foot sometimes stood
over a (Hezbollah) position and still could not identify it, even from the
ground."

This is the point where the story of the "closely-guarded material" comes
into the picture. Whereas the information regarding the "nature reserves"
had been obtained from highly sensitive sources, the information about those
"reserves" and about Hezbollah's deployment in the rural areas was treated
as "closely guarded" material that was only revealed to the superior echelon
and waited under lock and key for the day of reckoning. Every brigade had
its own "closely guarded" aids that were to be disseminated to the forces
when the time has come. This, as Halamish explains, was where the major
disruption occurred: "The primary mistake was that as soon as the decision
to go to war had been made, the material should have been opened
immediately, disseminated and assimilated among the commanders on the
ground, but this was never done." According to him, today the pendulum has
swung to the opposite extreme: "Too much information is currently being
reported to the lower echelons, despite classification problems."

In this context, Halamish lists and refers to other aspects of the field
intelligence: "Poor quality information systems at the field level that
compromised the ability to report information in real time. Emergency aids
and materials, some of the aids were not current and some of the
intelligence officers had left their emergency kits at the emergency storage
depots." In this context, intelligence officers who operated in the sector
of IDF Northern Command reported "A severe problem with aids that were
unsuitable for the various types of maneuvering, not current, not delivered
to everyone, not enough for everyone and so on."

One of the explanations Halamish offered regarding the circumstances of the
field level intelligence, with regard to commanders as well as intelligence
officers, was that "IDF had been busy in the territories in the years prior
to the War. A new generation had grown, made up of young commanders and
intelligence officers who knew nothing about Lebanon, and in my estimate the
general feeling was that after the pullout from Lebanon tranquility was
restored to the area, the abduction in October 2000 notwithstanding. The
commanders and intelligence officers thought they were coming to an
operation. Some of them had arrived directly from the Judea and Samaria
sector and when they reported to the area, their first question was 'where
is the ISA man?' They did not know what a POW interrogator was and why he
should be with them in Lebanon. Some of them had even left those
interrogators in Israeli territory and did not assign them to the combat
elements."

At the same time, Halamish maintains – and this is also backed by the
Winograd Commission: "I think the problem with the War had nothing to do
with the intelligence aspect. The problem was the lack of operational
decision-making as to what we wanted to accomplish and what the objective
was. The operational plans changed every day and units were shifted from one
sector to another with no logic whatsoever." He goes as far as pointing to a
conceptual problem at the supreme command level and to the gaps between IDF
Northern Command and the General Staff: "The IDF Chief of Staff thought
Hezbollah could be eliminated from the air only, and consequently he was not
enthusiastic about committing the ground forces, although he had been
authorized to do so by the political echelon." At the same time, gaps were
forming between IDF Northern Command HQ in Safed and the General Staff in
Tel-Aviv: "IDF Northern Command and the General Staff regarded different
objectives for the operation, and that was where a substantial part of the
problems was created."

Analyzing and Implementing the Lessons

Halamish remained in his position as IDF Chief Intelligence Officer until
2009, and along with Major-General Amos Yadlin, head of the IDF Intelligence
Directorate, was in charge of the debriefing/analysis and lesson drawing
process (a process further encouraged and supported by the subsequent heads
of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, Major-General Aviv Kochavi and
Major-General Hertzi Halevi). Numerous debriefing and analysis teams were
established within the IDF Intelligence Directorate in those days and one of
the primary conclusions they reached was that conceptual, organizational and
operational changes should be introduced with regard to the "connection"
between all of the layouts of the Intelligence Directorate and the field
intelligence elements. One of the primary lessons was to "bring home", back
to the Intelligence Directorate, the field intelligence officers from the
Chief Field Intelligence HQ, established in 2000: "My primary lesson from
the War, which is further supported by my tenure as Chief Field Intelligence
Officer, was that the intelligence cannot be divided between the Chief Field
Intelligence Officer and Chief Intelligence Officer. Accordingly,
immediately after the War had ended, we initiated the process of returning
the field intelligence back to the IDF Intelligence Directorate (a process
completed in 2009-2010, G.M.), and I think it proved itself in the various
operations in the Gaza Strip. Since then, there is one element that handles
intelligence from the ground up and from top to bottom – and that is the IDF
Intelligence Directorate."

Halamish testified that in the context of the lesson drawing and
implementation process, most of the lessons derived from the Second Lebanon
War were learned and implemented, and the intelligence even benefited from a
budgetary priority that enabled it to implement the changes: most of the
lessons were addressed and implemented as far back as during Operation Cast
Lead and the period thereafter and during Operation Pillar of Defense, down
to the brigade level, for example – in the form of teams of the imagery
interpretation and charting unit, as well as technical teams and
representatives of such intelligence gathering elements as the SigInt and
HumInt units. These teams can now link and operate with the brigades.
Additionally, a significant improvement has been noted in the cooperation
between the intelligence officers at the various levels and the intelligence
gathering layouts. A current infrastructure of intelligence aids was
prepared subject to quality standards and on a scale that would ensure it is
sufficient for all of the forces. A marked improvement has been noted with
regard to the collection capabilities at all levels. The process of
disseminating high-classification information to the forces on the ground
has been expanded and consolidated, and state-of-the-art information systems
were developed and deployed. In addition, Halamish noted that pursuant to
the Second Lebanon War, the quality of the field intelligence officers
improved and in recent years they have been performing better than before.
Most of them had graduated from analysis positions at the IDF Intelligence
Directorate's Analysis Division and/or at the regional commands, and,
possibly the crowning achievement of the entire process: "A better
connection has formed between the intelligence and fire elements, and even
as far back as during Operation Cast Lead, the Intelligence Directorate was
highly praised at all levels."



Gideon Mitchnik served as Intelligence Assistant to the Military Secretary
of the Minister of Defense during the Second Lebanon War