From: Dr. Aaron Lerner
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2017 6:31 PM
To: kobi michael
Subject: Question: Are you proposing USA support annexation if the
Palestinians prefer to continue their effort to isolate Israel in the
international theater?

Greetings,

Please clarify the meaning of the passage below from your article The
Palestinian “Internationalization” Strategy: End of the Road?

Do you mean that the US clarify it will support Israeli annexation of
settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley if the Palestinians prefer to
continue their effort to isolate Israel in the international theater?

"It is important that the United States clarify that if the Palestinians
prefer to continue their effort to isolate Israel in the international
theater, instead of returning to direct negotiations during the allotted
period, it will back independent measures by Israel for determining its
border in accordance with Israel’s strategic interests, while preserving the
possibility of future implementation of a negotiated two nation-state
solution. In this way, Israel can prepare for disengage from the
Palestinians, while retaining the settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley and
the possibility of security operations throughout the West Bank."
The Palestinian “Internationalization” Strategy: End of the Road?
INSS Insight No. 907, March 21, 2017
Amos Yadlin, Kobi Michael .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=13168

I would like to distribute your reply via www.imra.org.il

Thanks.

Best regards,
Dr. Aaron Lerner www.imra.org.il
-----Original Message-----
From: kobi michael
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2017 5:06 AM
To: 'Dr. Aaron Lerner'
Subject: RE: Question: Are you proposing USA support annexation if the
Palestinians prefer to continue their effort to isolate Israel in the
international theater?

Hi,
No, not at all. I mean that America will support independent moves for
setting the borders and security measures without annexation. Annexation at
this stage will signal that Israel doesn’t intend to leave a room for future
negotiation or agreement, but in the absence of political process, Israel
should ensure its strategic interests and shaping the reality in a way that
serves its interests and signals to the Palestinians that they can not set
the rules of the game and that there is a price tag for their refusal and
wrong strategy.
Kobi

Kobi Michael Ph.D.
Senior Researcher
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
40 Haim Levanon St. POB 39950
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 6997556
Israel
=======================================================
The Palestinian “Internationalization” Strategy: End of the Road?
INSS Insight No. 907, March 21, 2017
Amos Yadlin, Kobi Michael .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=13168

SUMMARY: When the Netanyahu government replaced the Olmert government and
Barack Obama assumed the United States presidency, the Palestinians adopted
an “internationalization strategy.” This choice reflected the Palestinian
skepticism about the possibility of bridging the gaps with Israel and the
hope that the international community would accept their tripartite demand:
(1) establishment of a Palestinian state (2) on the basis of the 1967
borders (3) with East Jerusalem as its capital. The consolidation of the new
administration in the United States, the unease among the Israeli public
with the existing situation in the Palestinian context, and the room for
maneuver in this context available to the Israeli leadership create a unique
opportunity to fashion a new Israeli policy for dealing with the conflict
with the Palestinians, and for coordinating this policy with the United
States. This strategy should rest on the neutralization of the Palestinian
internationalization strategy and incentives to the Palestinians to return
to direct negotiations with Israel in order to achieve a settlement on the
basis of a two nation-state solution.
.
Some eight years ago, when the Netanyahu government replaced the Olmert
government and Barack Obama assumed the United States presidency, the
Palestinians adopted an “internationalization strategy.” This choice
reflected the Palestinian skepticism about the possibility of bridging the
gaps with Israel (including with Olmert’s far reaching proposals) and the
hope that the international community would accept their tripartite demand:
(1) establishment of a Palestinian state (2) on the basis of the 1967
borders (3) with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Palestinians hoped to
achieve this without having to contribute the minimum demanded by Israel for
achievement of an agreement: committing to an end of conflict and finality
of claims; waiving the right of return; and agreeing to security
arrangements that to some extent would limit their sovereignty. The
Palestinians pursued measures to prompt the international community to
establish a Palestinian state as per the outline they wanted, but without
negotiations with Israel and without the concessions necessary in order to
achieve an agreement through negotiations.

The Palestinian internationalization strategy was bolstered by a public
relations effort to implant the Palestinian narrative of the reasons for the
conflict and the “just way of solving it,” and to saddle Israel with
responsibility for the political deadlock. This was joined by general
efforts to delegitimize Israel. This strategy, which focuses on a persistent
systematic, effort to blacken Israel in international institutions,
undermine its legitimacy, and deny the historic national connection of the
Jewish people to the Land of Israel, has scored several notable achievements
in recent years.

During the Obama administration, Israeli and Palestinian leaders did not
return to direct talks, despite the temporary freeze on Israeli construction
in the West Bank that President Obama succeeded in imposing on the Israeli
government; despite the mediation efforts of the President’s special envoy,
former Senator George Mitchell; and despite the mediation efforts of King
Abdullah of Jordan. One of the prominent achievements by the Palestinian
national movement was the 2012 UN General Assembly resolution defining
Palestine as a “non-member observer state.”

Furthermore, the Palestinians succeeded in entrenching within the US
administration the belief that Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank
was the main obstacle to an agreement. In this sense President Obama’s Cairo
University speech of May 2009 was a convenient point of departure. Two
subsequent extremely important diplomatic achievements were the
administration’s decision to abstain in the December 23, 2016 UN Security
Council vote, which passed Resolution 2334 establishing that the 1967
borders were the basis for negotiations (in contrast to Resolution 242,
which requires an Israel withdrawal from “territories” occupied in 1967),
and the speech given by John Kerry at the conclusion of his tenure as
Secretary of State, which he chose to devote to the Israeli-Palestinian
issue.

The confidence gained by the Palestinians with their political and
diplomatic achievements over the years was reflected in the threats against
the Trump administration should it carry out the President’s campaign pledge
to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem. Senior Palestinian officials
threatened the administration that they would “make its life miserable” in
UN institutions, and that the entire Middle East would explode in a wave of
violence. PLO Secretary General Saeb Erekat even threatened to cancel
recognition of Israel, and to give the keys to the Palestinian Authority to
Israel. Overall, it appears that the Palestinians are having difficulty in
internalizing two major changes that have made their internationalization
strategy much less relevant: the Trump administration is not committed to
the Palestinians to the same degree as was the Obama administration, and the
Israeli narrative is closer to the outlook of the current administration
than the Palestinian narrative.

In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become less important in
the Arab world and in the international community. Indeed, for several years
the Palestinian issue has not led the agenda of Arab leaders, who are
preoccupied by acute problems in their respective states and the region at
large that have far reaching geopolitical consequences. The fact that Israel
is a source of stability and an ally in the struggle against Iran on the one
hand and against the Islamic State on the other, combined with the weakening
of US support for regimes in the region, particularly Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, has altered their prioritization of the conflict. Furthermore, the
challenges encountered by the major powers in dealing with other disputes
and conflicts in the Middle East, led by the civil war in Syria, instability
in Yemen and Iraq, the strengthening of Hezbollah, and the increased
influence of Iran and Russia in the Middle East, also currently undermine
the effectiveness of the Palestinian strategy. Ten million Syrian refugees,
a humanitarian disaster in Yemen, and instability in Iraq and Libya have
shunted the Palestinian issue to the region’s political sidelines.

Israel’s interest is that the United States, and not the international
community, which has accepted the Palestinian narrative practically in toto,
should lead the international effort to address regional issues, including
the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It is therefore important for Israel to
coordinate an official response on the Palestinian question with the US
administration, while changing the rules of the game that the Palestinians
have managed to impose in recent years. There is likely to be a greater and
more concrete ability of the United States to spearhead this issue now,
thanks to a more resolute policy by the new President, the joint recognition
of priorities, and the joint formulation of a relevant strategy.

With the consolidation of the new administration in the White House, which
appears to be open to new ideas, Israel therefore has an opportunity, in
coordination with this administration, to reshape the range of possibilities
concerning the Palestinian issue as an element in a broad regional strategy.
The Trump administration has already declared that the Israeli-Palestinian
issue should be returned to the negotiating table in the framework of a
bilateral dialogue, and that it does not accept unilateral anti-Israeli
dictates at the UN or in the Quartet. The administration does not favor
continued construction in the settlements or Israeli annexation of territory
in the West Bank, but at the same time, it does not accept the Palestinian
argument that Israel and the settlements are the obstacle to peace.

Israel’s interest requires coordination and understanding with the United
States on what are truly significant challenges in the region: Iranian
subversion and terrorism, the conflict in Syria, the need to strengthen
Egypt and Jordan as stabilizing elements, and the failed states in the
region, which can potentially cause instability and undermine regional
security, including in the international system (particularly in Europe).
The Israeli-Palestinian issue should thus be assigned a lower priority than
it received during the Obama administration, with a joint Israeli-American
effort to persuade the Palestinians of the futility of the
internationalization strategy.

The new priority assigned to the conflict and the efforts to reach a
settlement are not designed to strengthen the status quo – on the contrary.
Paradoxically, the Palestinian internationalization strategy, the
Palestinian refusal to advance to the second stage of the Roadmap, i.e.,
temporary borders for the future Palestinian state, and the all or nothing
position of the two sides on the core issues have prevented progress toward
a solution to the conflict. Making it unmistakably clear to the Palestinians
that they must return to the negotiating process and mutual give and take,
and also accept transitional and interim arrangements as preferable
alternatives to the status quo will engender greater potential for progress
than during the Obama administration.

As an initial sign to the Palestinians that the rules of the game have
changed, moving the American embassy to Jerusalem is in order. An American
retreat from this pledge, even if in a flexible and creative format, as a
result of the Palestinian threat aimed at preventing this measure, will
weaken the American stature, and become an incentive for the Palestinians to
adhere to a strategy of bypassing Israel and evading direct negotiations.
Initial signs interpreted by the Palestinians as an American retreat from
this promise have already led senior Palestinian figures to announce their
intention to continue to target Israel in the international theater and
promote a Security Council resolution on the illegality of the settlements,
this time under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, even though it is clear that
this time the US will veto it. It is therefore important for the United
States to uphold the promise to move the embassy to Jerusalem, while
underscoring that its location in the western part of the city on territory
not subject to dispute, which will remain under Israeli sovereignty in any
settlement, is a sovereign American decision, and does not indicate a
retreat by the United States from its traditional position about determining
the future of East Jerusalem through negotiations between the parties.

The consolidation of the new administration in the United States, the unease
among the Israeli public with the existing situation in the Palestinian
context, and the room for maneuver in this context available to the Israeli
leadership create a unique opportunity to fashion a new Israeli policy for
dealing with the conflict with the Palestinians, and for coordinating this
policy with the United States. This strategy should rest on the
neutralization of the Palestinian internationalization strategy and
incentives to the Palestinians to return to direct negotiations with Israel
in order to achieve a settlement on the basis of a two nation-state
solution. These must be accompanied by three principal requirements: a
specific time framework for the Palestinians to return to the negotiating
table; a Palestinian commitment to an orderly and responsible process of
state building (institutions, economy, a monopoly of force, enforcement of
law and order), in order to ensure that the Palestinian state that arises
will be a functional and not a failed state; and an end to incitement and
monetary support for terrorists imprisoned in Israel and for the families of
terrorists who were killed.

It is important that the United States clarify that if the Palestinians
prefer to continue their effort to isolate Israel in the international
theater, instead of returning to direct negotiations during the allotted
period, it will back independent measures by Israel for determining its
border in accordance with Israel’s strategic interests, while preserving the
possibility of future implementation of a negotiated two nation-state
solution. In this way, Israel can prepare for disengage from the
Palestinians, while retaining the settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley and
the possibility of security operations throughout the West Bank. At the same
time, territorial contiguity for the Palestinian entity and the undisturbed
movement from the northern to the southern West Bank should be promoted and
permitted. In addition, the international community and Israel will take
action to develop the Palestinian infrastructure and economy, including
through allocation of parts of Area C for these defined purposes.

Findings from a public opinion survey on national security matters conducted
recently by the Institute for National Security Studies indicate that the
majority of the Israeli public opposes a continuation of the existing
situation or annexation of territory. Only 10 percent support annexation of
all of Judea and Samaria, and 17 percent favor the continuation of the
existing situation. Sixty-one percent of the public favor a settlement, be
it a permanent agreement or an interim agreement in advance of a permanent
agreement. As the Israeli public wants a change, the Israeli leadership has
the flexibility and room for maneuver in this matter. Coordination with the
United States under the special circumstances created will make it possible
to disarm the Palestinian threats and the Palestinian internationalization
strategy, assign the Palestinian issue a more balanced position on the
regional and global agenda, and shape a more suitable security and strategic
situation for Israel as a Jewish and democratic, secure, and just state.