Part 2 Document: Complete text of Barak Government “white paper” on
PA/PLO non-compliance
21 November, 2000
Part 2 Document: Complete text of
Barak Government “white paper” on PA/PLO non-compliance
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A Stake in the Welfare of the Governed?
Another assumption which sustained the process was the hope that as the P.A. became an
established "government", its choices in the future would be colored by the need
to provide for the best interests of the governed - even if the evolution of democratic
politics in the P.A. was far from complete.
This assumption, too, has been brought into question over time, and shattered by recent
events. In addition to broader problems arising from the P.A.'s mismanagement of public
and economic affairs, specific aspects of its policy towards Israel - above all, the
failure to deliver on the restraint of terrorism and terrorist infrastructure - obliged
Israel to apply restrictions on the freedom of movement and employment of Palestinians. It
is particularly young people who are easily mobilized by the Hamas and its likes, within
Israel.
It was easy enough for the P.A. to blame Israel for the consequences of these
restrictions; but at their root was Arafat's persistent ambiguity on his security
commitments (and indeed, when these were more strictly adhered to - under pressure from
outside - economic life in the Palestinian governed areas improved significantly, as in
1998-1999).
The Palestinian leadership's disregard for the welfare of the governed has now risen to a
new level. The thrust of Palestinian propaganda in recent weeks is unmistakable:
suffering, particularly the death of children, has become instrumental as its rallying cry
to its own people and the Arab world. Thus, it has systematically exploited the tragic
death of the child Muhammad al-Durra at Netzarim junction - where he was caught in the
crossfire of a gun battle, the P.A. deliberately misrepresenting his death as a
"cold-blooded execution", often several times an hour throughout its television
broadcasts.
In effect, this strategy feeds upon further suffering and disruption - including
self-induced economic hardships, while Israel actually seeks to ensure supplies to the
P.A. areas. The tactics of the Fatah "Tanzim" (militia) are also apparently
designed to bring about further suffering upon civilian populations - as made evident by
their use of Beit Jala – a Christian community - to fire on Gilo in Jerusalem, with
the full knowledge of the consequences for the (unwilling) residents.
Give and Take at the Bilateral Table?
At the core of the present strategy, as clearly stated in Arafat's speech at the Emergency
Arab summit in Cairo (October 21), is the threat that there will be no regional nor
international stability unless Palestinian demands are met; and the call upon the
international community to replace the current structure of the process (the U.S.,
according to Arafat, having failed to impose "International Legitimacy" in its
Arab interpretation) with a mechanism of coercion.
Palestinian suffering is thus made the focus of an 'appeal to the U.N. - including an
abuse of the "Uniting for Peace" procedure (which enables the UN General
Assembly to overrule the Security Council), and a spurious call for the Security Councilto send forces, Kosovo-style, to "protect the Palestinian Territories" - all in
an obvious effort to walk away from the negotiating table and avoid the tough choices
involved.
Evidence for such concepts of "Internationalization" being worked on by Nabil
Sha'ath, the P.A. Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, has been available
for well over a year (e.g. his statement to al-Ayyam, an official P.A. organ, on May 9,
1999); the current drive for an international commission of inquiry is part and parcel of
this design.
The Root Causes
What has led Arafat and the P.A. leadership to opt for violence and incitement as an
instrument of policy? A consistent pattern of behavior over several weeks, with a clearly
defined set of goals ("Internationalization" of the conflict) and with the means
(televised Palestinian sacrifice and suffering) apparently well-tailored to achieve them,
cannot be simply dismissed as a passing aberration or a "caprice". Within the
limits of what modern political science calls "bounded rationality", Arafat's
gamble is risky, but not irrational.
Still, to understand the root causes for this choice – or rather, the Palestinian
refusal to choose, once and for all, the path of peace - it is necessary to point out,
albeit briefly, some of the recurrent themes in Arafat's political conduct over the years.
Arafat's Strategy of Avoiding Choices
Throughout his tenure as a leader of Fatah movement and the P.L.O., Arafat attached
particular importance to the principle of maintaining "Istiqlal al-Qarrar", i.e.
his ability to avoid becoming anyone's "agent" (and there were many in the
Palestinian arena identified as working for some Arab or foreign interests...).
A key element in his ability to do so, at least until a major crisis forced a choice or a
decision on him, was the constant manoeuver between the poles of any regional or
international system in which he worked - Egypt and her rivals in the Arab world; the Cold
War protagonists; the Syrians and their enemies in Lebanon.
In recent years, this pattern of "fence-sitting" and indecision evolved around
two polarities:-
* Playing the U.S. (with which he established a dialogue in December 1988) vs. Iraq (which
he came to see as a heroic Arab counter-balance to U.S. power). To some extent, this
lactic is still at work. While speaking favorably of Clinton (as distinct from the U.S.
Congress...) at the Emergency Arab Summit in Cairo, Arafat also endorsed the call for the
lifting of sanctions on the Suffering Iraqi People. Pro-Iraqi sentiments, including the
fervent call of demonstrators for Saddam Hussein to "hit, hit Tel Aviv" (with
chemical warheads) are indeed rife among Palestinians even now, despite the lessons
learned from the disastrous choice in 1990-1991.
* Playing the dialogue with Israel (and the formal obligations detailed above) - vs. an
ambivalent attitude towards the Hamas, terrorism, and the use of violence: the
consequences of this way of keeping his options open, and avoiding any implication that he
now "belongs" to Israel (like the former S.L.A. in Lebanon...) have become
manifest in the recent crisis.
Diverting Attention from Domestic Failure
In recent months - well before the Camp David Summit, and not necessarily in connection
with Arafat's positions in the negotiations - a broad body of evidence (albeit vague and
circumstantial, given the lack of reliable tools to analyze Palestinian public sentiment
under an authoritarian power structure) indicated that much of the P.A.'s initial credit
with its own "constituency" has been spent: Khalil Shikaki's surveys of
Palestinian opinion found that Arafat's approval rates have been falling steadily - well
bellow 40% - and that a vast majority of respondents thought of the P.A. institutions as
venal, corrupt and incompetent.
At the core of the problem is the system of centralized economic monopolies, dominated by
Muhammad Rashid (Khalid Salam) and his PCSC - with a monopoly Of several basic commodities
("Guardian", April 27, 1997); the al-Masri family and their holding company,
PADICO; and the varied economic interests of the Security "bosses", Dahlan and
Rajoub.
The results are clear to see: in a climate hostile to real competition and to transparent
free market practices, blatant disregard for personal property, bribery, corruption and
mismanagement of domestic and aid funds, as well as the lack of compliance with
commitments to refrain from those customs have been well documented by the PA'S own public
monitoring department, the "Donor countries" and numerous NGO's.
[Graph: The development of the Palestinian Real Product per capita
1993 = 100 (shows peak in 1994 with decline until 1997 followed by partial recovery up to
first half of 2000]
The most striking proof of the PA'S mishandling of its population can be found in the lack
of care for its most needy population - the refugees. Not only does the PA insist on not
using any portion of its budget towards improving their living standards, it is demanding
'that the international community increases its support for them.
Calls upon Arafat, by some of his best friends - such as the Council of Foreign Relations
(CFR) team, which examined Palestinian governance - - went unheeded, and calls for change
from within were roughly repressed. Given this bleak prospect (which reportedly led even
Jerusalem's Palestinian residents, let alone Israeli Arabs, to resist the notion of being
transferred to P.A. governance...)
It is not surprising that Arafat may have felt more comfortable igniting a nationalist
struggle - and pinning the blame for future deprivations on Israel - than focusing on the
urgent need to reform the Palestinian system.
Conspiracy Theories and Miscalculations
Another recurrent pattern which does color Arafat's judgement, at times - and was
certainly evident in the manner in which he "explained" the current crisis to
the Emergency Session of the Arab Summit - is his tendency to weave conspiracy theories
(Mu'amarat) and use them, with a thin line separating fact from fiction.
Thus - as an example - in a series of interviews in March and April 1995, including a
fascinating meeting with a sympathetic Israeli and American audience, Arafat raised the
argument that a secret Israeli organization - an "O.A.S." within the GSS... -
working through the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, was in fact responsible for a
series of terrorist attacks such as the bombing in Beit Lid (in which 22 Israelis died).
It should be noted that this fantastic argument came (already then) in conjunction with a
warning: any attempt by Israel to stall on the peace process - because of the security
"excuse", as he saw it - would have a terrible affect on Israel's standing in
the world:-
"King Hussein will not go on with you, the Egyptians will not, Senegal will not,
Mandela will not, if the process with us fails ...not with the whole of Africa, and the
five Muslim states in Central Asia, not with all of them, not even with China. You know
how strong our links are with all of these states..." (Gid'on Levi in
"Haaretz", April 28, 1995; see also "al-Hayyat l-Jadidah", March 22,
1995).
This mixture of wild conspiracy theory, and the threat that Israel, the region and the
world will know no stability - unless his demands are met - was central, more recently, to
his speech in Cairo, where he blamed Israel and the I.D.F. for having conspired for more
than a year to prepare the "butchery" of the Palestinian people: hence the
urgent need for international protection to be introduced into all "Palestinian
Territories".
The danger implicit in such manipulative assertions and "claims on reality" is
that they can easily develop into a major misreading of the situation and a harmful
miscalculation – as was the case in 1995, when Arafat absolved himself in this manner
from any serious effort to curb terrorism; and might be the case now.
[Illustration: The map of "Palestinian Territory" in an official PA document
including all of Israel]
Appendix A; The key commitments undertaken by the P.L.O./ P.A.
"In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the
PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to
take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and
terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping
reconstruction, economic development and cooperation".
(Arafat to the then Foreign Minister of Norway, Johan Jorgen Hoist, September 9, 1993 - in
a letter which preceded and enabled the DOP).
This letter to Hoist, and many other formal commitments made since, -were in fact kept at
times', but in a haphazard fashion, and only when it was expedient to do so. All of this
contradicts key commitments asked for - and obtained – from the Palestinian
negotiating partner over the years:
Combating Terror and Violence
* Renunciation of the use of terrorism and other acts of violence (Arafat's Letter toRabin, September 9, 1993).
* Recognition of the right of Israel to exist in peace and security (Arafat's Letter to
Rabin, September 9, 1993).
* Commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and that outstanding permanent
status issues will be resolved through negotiations (Arafat's Letter to Rabin, September
9,1993).
* Adoption of all necessary measures to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities
and taking of legal measures against offenders (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article XVIII;
Interim Agreement, Article XV).
* Establishment of a strong police force in order to guarantee public order and internal
security for Palestinians (Declaration of Principles, Article VIII; Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, Article VIII; Annex I, Article III; Interim Agreement, Article XII, Article
XIV).
* The Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expressions of violence and
terror (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.1).
* The Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of
perpetrating acts of violence or terror (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.1).
* Immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of
violence or incitement (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.2).
* Apprehension, investigation and prosecution of those directly or indirectly involved in
acts of terrorism, violence and incitement (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.3).
* Security arrangements concerning planning, building and zoning (Gaza-Jericho Agreement,
Annex I, Article VI; Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article XII).
* Reaffirmation of commitment to fight terror and violence (Note for the Record on Hebron
- January 1997).
* Reaffirmation of commitment to systematically and effectively combat terrorist
organizations and infrastructure (Note _for the Record on Hebron – January 1997).
* Reaffirmation of commitment to apprehend, prosecute and punishment of terrorists (Note
for the Record).
* Recognition that it is in their vital interests to combat terrorism and fight violence
(Wye River Memorandum, Article II).
* Israeli-Palestinian cooperation to combat violence and terror (Wye River Memorandum,
Article II).
* Comprehensive, continuous and long-term struggle against terror and violence with
respect to terrorists, terror support structure and environment conducive to the supportof terror (Wye River Memorandum, Article II).
* Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence
against both sides (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.Ia).
* Palestinian work plan to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist
organizations and their infrastructure (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.Ib).
* US-Palestinian committee to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells
and terror support structure (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.Ic).
* Apprehension of individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror and
establishment of US-Palestinian committee to review such matter (Wye River Memorandum,
Article II.A.Id.e).
* Act to ensure immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a
threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement. Exchange of information and
coordination of policies and activities in this regard(Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Article
8.a).
* Immediate and effective response to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act
of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such
an occurrence (Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Article 8.a).
Prevention of Incitement
* Abstention from incitement, including hostile propaganda and adoption of legal measures
to prevent such incitement (Interim Agreement, Article XXII).
* Non-introduction of motifs into educational systems (Interim Agreement, Article XXII).
* Immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of
violence or incitement (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.2).
* Active prevention of incitement to violence (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.3).
* Apprehension, investigation and prosecution of those directly or indirectly involved in
acts of terrorism, violence and incitement (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article 11.3).
* Reaffirmation of commitment to prevent incitement and hostile propaganda (Note for the
Record).
* Issuance of a decree, comparable to existing Israeli legislation, prohibiting all forms
of incitement to violence or terror and establishment of mechanisms for acting against all
expressions or threats of violence or terror (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.3a).
* Establishment of a US-Palestinian-Israeli committee to monitor cases of possible
incitement to violence or terror and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent
such incitement (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.3b).
* Immediate and effective response to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act
of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such
an occurrence (Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Article 8 .a).
Prohibition of Illegal Weapons
* No manufacture, sale, acquisition, importation or introduction of any firearms,
ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or related equipment into the West Bank or Gaza
Strip, except for those of the Palestinian Police (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article IX.3;
Interim Agreement, Article XIV).
* The Palestinian Police will prevent the manufacture of weapons as well as the transfer
of weapons to persons not licensed to possess them (Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article
X1.2).
* Limitations on arms and ammunition for the Palestinian Police (Gaza-Jericho Agreement,
Annex I, Article III.5, Interim Agreement, Annex I, Article IV; Hebron Protocol, Article
5).
* Reaffirmation of commitment to confiscate illegal firearms (Note for the Record).
* Ensuring an effective legal framework to criminalize any importation, manufacturing or
unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition or weapons in areas
under Palestinian jurisdiction (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.2a).
* Establishment and implementation of a systematic program for the collection and
appropriate handling of illegal weapons etc. (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.A.2b).
* Establishment of a US-Palestinian-Israeli committee to assist and enhance cooperation in
preventing the smuggling or unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosive materials
into Palestinian areas (Wye River Memorandum, Article ILA.2c).
* Continuation of the program for the collection of illegal weapons, including reports
(Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, Article 8.b). Security Cooperation with the Israeli Side
* Establishment of a Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee and District
Coordination Offices (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article VIII; Annex I, Article II; Interim
Agreement, Article XII).
* Establishment and operation of Joint Patrols and Joint Mobile Units (Gaza-Jericho
Agreement, Annex I, Article II; Hebron Protocol, Article 4).
* Establishment of Joint Aviation Committee and Maritime Coordination and Cooperation
Center (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex I, Article XI, XII; Interim Agreement, Annex I
Articles XIII, XIV).
* Arrest and transfer of individuals suspected of, charged with or convicted of an offense
falling under Israeli criminal jurisdiction (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex III, Article
11.7; Interim Agreement, Annex IV, Article 11.7).
* Requests for arrest and transfer of individuals to be submitted to the Joint Legal
Committee must be responded to within a twelve-week period (Wye River Memorandum, Article
II.B.3)
* Full and comprehensive bilateral security cooperation (Wye River Memorandum, Article
II.B.I).
* Exchange of forensic expertise, training and assistance (Wye River Memorandum, ArticleII.B.2).
* Establishment of high ranking US-Palestinian-Israeli committee to assess current
threats, deal with impediments to effective security cooperation and address steps being
taken to combat terror and terror organizations (Wye River Memorandum, Article II.B.3).
Undertaking to implement its responsibilities for security and security cooperation (Sharm
el-Sheikh Memorandum, Article 8).
Appendix B
Implementation Of The Sharm E-Sheikh Understandings (17-29 October)
29 Oct. þ2000
Public statements unequivocally calling for an end of violence
Israeli side: Unequivocal Palestinian side: Vague
Opening of international passages
Israeli side: Completed
Opening of the Gaza Airport
Israeli side: Open and operational
Opening of internal closure
Israeli side: Completed
Ensure an end to violence and maintain the calm
Palestinian side: Continuation of live-fire from automatic weapons and use of explosive
devices (~24 incidents per day)
Renewal of security cooperation
Israel initialed 3 meetings which were convened at the RSC level
Renewal of cooperation towards the prevention of terrorism
Palestinian refusal to participate in Israeli initiated meetings; very low level ad hoc
cooperation
Eliminating points of friction
Palestinian side: No reduction
Reimprisonment of released terrorists and security fugitives
Palestinian side: Hardly any activity- ~30 from over 100; almost all of the 30 were
arrested before the Summit; 5 have since been released after their arrest
End of incitement
Palestinian side: Continuation of incitement on official Palestinian broadcasts
