Parody: SGS To Document And Supervise Hezbollah's Weapons Inventory
Dr. Aaron lerner 19 November 2024

Dear Reader,

Yes - it would be absurd for the international inspection company, SGS, to
catalog and label all the weapons Hezbollah has at the moment of a ceasefire
and then serve as an intermediary when Israel claims Hezbollah has added
weapons to their inventory.

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein is working on an equally absurd proposal.

Correction: a WORSE proposal.

Why worse?

Because, beyond allowing Hezbollah to keep all their weapons, U.S. envoy
Amos Hochstein is proposing that we enter into negotiations for "border
adjustments".

That's right.

The Biden administration thinks it would be a swell idea to reward Hezbollah
with Israeli territory.
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[PARODY] Protocol for Inspection and Oversight of Hezbollah Weapons
Inventory under Ceasefire Agreement

Objective

This protocol establishes a framework for inventorying, monitoring, and
overseeing Hezbollah’s arsenal of rockets, missiles, drones, and related
weaponry during a ceasefire. It aims to ensure compliance with the ceasefire
terms while respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and minimizing civilian harm.

Section I: Initial Inventory and Identification by Société Générale de
Surveillance (SGS)

1. Inventory Procedure
• SGS will conduct a comprehensive inventory of all rockets,
missiles, drones, and other weaponry in Hezbollah’s possession.
• Hezbollah will grant SGS unrestricted access to its storage
facilities and weapons caches under strict confidentiality to ensure
transparency.

2. Identification and Tagging
• SGS will apply tamper-proof stickers or markers to each
weapon. These stickers will:
• Be uniquely numbered to correspond with the weapon.
• Include security features to prevent counterfeiting.
• Be durable and resistant to environmental damage.
• Each weapon will be photographed and cataloged alongside its
unique number in a secure, centralized database maintained by SGS.

3. Reporting and Documentation
• SGS will produce an inventory report listing all weapons,
their unique identifiers, and storage locations. This report will be shared
confidentially with the ceasefire stakeholders: Hezbollah, Israel, and the
designated ceasefire monitoring body (e.g., UN representatives).

Section II: Handling Claims of Additional Weapons

1. Submission of Evidence
• If Israel identifies suspected new weapons not included in
the initial inventory, it will submit evidence to SGS. Evidence must
include:
• Location coordinates.
• Supporting data from satellite imagery, reconnaissance, or
other verifiable sources.

2. Unannounced Inspections
• SGS will dispatch inspectors without prior warning to the
specified locations to verify the claim.
• Inspectors will document their findings, including
photographing the weapons and checking for the absence of inventory
stickers.

3. Resolution of Violations
• If SGS confirms the presence of new, undocumented weapons:
• Hezbollah will be given the opportunity to destroy the
weapons under SGS supervision.
• If Hezbollah refuses, Israel will have the right to
neutralize the weapons.
• Israel’s actions must comply with proportionality
requirements outlined in international humanitarian law:
• Civilian casualties must be minimized.
• If weapons are in a civilian-populated area, Israel must use
precision methods or seek alternative solutions to avoid significant harm to
non-combatants.

Section III: Replacement of Defective Weapons

1. Procedure for Replacement
• Hezbollah may replace defective weapons with functional ones
under SGS supervision.
• SGS will:
• Verify the defectiveness of the weapon being replaced.
• Assign a unique sticker to the new weapon and update the
inventory database.

2. Transparency and Accountability
• All replacements will be documented in a supplemental report
by SGS and shared with ceasefire stakeholders to ensure transparency.

Section IV: Provisions for Unilateral Destruction of Inventory Weapons by
Israel

1. Documentation of Destruction
• In the event that Israel conducts a unilateral attack
against Hezbollah, causing damage or destruction to weapons included in the
official inventory, SGS will verify and document the losses.
• The verification process will involve:
• Inspecting the destroyed sites.
• Comparing the destroyed weapons to the inventory database
using their unique identifiers.

2. Replacement of Destroyed Weapons
• Hezbollah will have the right to replace weapons destroyed
in unilateral Israeli attacks, subject to the following conditions:
• Replacements must be of the same type and quantity as the
destroyed weapons.
• The replacement process will be conducted under SGS
supervision to ensure transparency.
• The new weapons will be assigned unique stickers and updated
in the inventory database.

3. Reporting
• SGS will provide a detailed report on the destruction and
replacement process to all ceasefire stakeholders to ensure accountability.

Section V: Israel’s Monitoring Restrictions

1. Respect for Sovereignty
• Israel will not conduct monitoring activities that violate
Lebanon’s territorial integrity.
• Monitoring will rely on:
• Satellite imagery.
• Reconnaissance conducted from beyond Lebanese airspace or
territorial waters.

2. Monitoring Distance
• A minimum distance of:
• 20 km offshore from Lebanese territorial waters for maritime
surveillance.
• 5 km from the Lebanon-Israel border for land-based
monitoring, ensuring no violation of airspace.

3. Altitude Considerations
• Israel will utilize high-altitude surveillance methods that
do not infringe upon Lebanese airspace sovereignty. While there is no
universally agreed-upon vertical boundary between national airspace and
outer space, the Kármán line at 100 km altitude is commonly used as a
reference point. Israel will ensure that any aerial surveillance platforms
operate at altitudes above 100 km to avoid violating Lebanese airspace.

4. Reporting Mechanisms
• Israel will submit findings to SGS for verification rather
than act unilaterally, ensuring all claims are addressed through the
protocol.

Section VI: Oversight and Compliance

1. Ceasefire Monitoring Body
• A neutral monitoring body (e.g., the United Nations) will
oversee the implementation of this protocol and address disputes.

2. Regular Audits
• SGS will conduct periodic audits of Hezbollah’s weapon
inventory to ensure compliance.
• Any discrepancies will be reported immediately to all
stakeholders.

3. Accountability Measures
• Violations of the protocol by either party will be referred
to the ceasefire monitoring body for resolution and potential sanctions.

Section VII: Conclusion

This protocol balances the need for accountability with the respect for
sovereignty and international law. By leveraging the expertise of SGS and
implementing clear procedures, it ensures that all parties adhere to the
ceasefire terms while minimizing risks to civilians and maintaining regional
stability.
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Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations

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